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Trust Co. vs. The Keefe Manufacturingand Investment Cc.,
40 Colo. 440, 91 Pac. 915 (1907), lays down a slightly different rule. Here a materialman sued the surety on a contractor's bond which had been given to the owner. The court
said, without distinguishing between a donee and a creditor
beneficiary, that the promisor and promisee could not vary
the terms of the bond after the beneficiary had "accepted" it.
It is not entirely clear what the court means by "accept," but
apparently the word is used as synonymous with "assent." If
this interpretation is correct then the case gives more power
to the promisor and promisee than the Starbird case, supra,
but less than the general rule. The rule as laid down here
was dictum, however, for the bond was conditional and the
condition had not been satisfied.
In conclusion, then, it may be said that Colorado, in common with many other jurisdictions, fails to distinguish between cases of donee and creditor beneficiaries. Theoretically, a distinction can and should be made, but perhaps it is
better that there be a single rule covering all types of cases, or,
if distinctions are to be drawn, that they be on practical and
equitable grounds rather than for theoretical reasons, as is
frequently done in giving insurance beneficiaries the greatest
GEORGE S. GRAHAM, Class of 1936.
possible rights.

FOR COLORADO: A CRIMINAL CODE?
We may think the law is the same if we refuse to
change the formulas. The identity is verbal only.
The formula no longer has the same correspondence with reality.-BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO in

A

Paradoxes of Legal Science.

S OLD as laws and lawyers is public dissatisfaction with

both-a dissatisfaction pervasive,

ubiquitous, and

without analogy in any other area of endeavor. Stage
and platform echo with the perennial theme of the law's delay
and the lawyer's vested interest in the evils of the status quo,
and the same theme fills many books and more editorials.
Criminal justice, in which the public as such is most obviously concerned, is the most commonly and fiercely assailed
object of all.
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One school of criticism holds that criminal procedure, by
cloaking the accused with the protection of violent presumptions and absurd safeguards, becomes the ally of the gangster-a sort of super-public enemy number one.
Another asserts criminal procedure to be the means and
the visible sign of class struggle and class inequality, of an
immense differential advantage in a game the services of whose
most skilled players are for sale to the highest bidder.
A third damns its rules with the cliche of "unscientific"
and asserts them to be the stale product of an art that has
marked time these many years while the sciences have gone
marching bravely on.
Last winter the writer, together with Mr. Joseph Hodges
of the district attorney's office, made for a committee of the
Denver Bar Association a comparison of the American Law
Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure with Colorado statutes and constitutional provisions on the same subject. The
method of the survey was to list the institute's code, section
by section, and to place opposite each section of the code the
Colorado provisions, if any, in point.
It is impossible in the scope of this paper to attempt even
a summary of so detailed a survey. It is possible, necessarily,
only to state conclusions of opinion for what they may be
worth. It is to be understood that the opinions expressed
herein are the writer's personal opinions and do not necessarily represent the views of Mr. Hodges, Mr. Stearns, or any
member of the committee.
How then, in the light of the commoner popular criticisms of criminal procedure outlined above, do the existing
Colorado laws compare with the American Law Institute
Code?
Those who would find in the code a panacea for "crime"
in the form of surrender to mass hysteria of the laboriously
acquired theory of our law that it is better some guilty persons escape punishment than the innocent be convicted, will
look in vain.
In some respects the code might be considered to protect
the rights of the accused less elaborately than the existing
Colorado statutes. The code, for one thing, eliminates the
necessity of a unanimous jury in cases less than capital,
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requiring a five-sixths concurrence of jurors in cases of felonies and a two-thirds concurrence in cases of misdemeanor,
the proportions being based upon a jury of twelve.
In general, however, the changes made by the code in this
respect reduce themselves to changes iii law to meet altered
conditions of life for the purpose of preserving, and not of
destroying, the balance struck by the common law between
the rights of the state and of the accused. That is to say, in
terms of the theory of Mr. Justice Cardozo, represented by
the quotations which preface this article, certain forms of
procedure appropriate to maintain a given balance in a stagecoach age are inappropriate to maintain the same balance in
an airplane age. The code preserves the balance that existing
laws once embodied and now, by their own inertia and the
momentum of change, threaten to destroy.
So far as the second and third criticisms of criminal procedure are concerned there is little to choose between the
existing Colorado provisions and the American Law Institute Code. While the adversary theory of justice remains
essentially the basis of both, each exhibits a trend away from
it in respect to such matters as the court's power to appoint
experts to examine the defendant when his mental condition
has become an issue. Both give the court such power, and
the 1927 Colorado law on the subject, though differing
somewhat in mechanics from the code, is no less enlightened
a piece of legislation, and either might be considered a partial
rebuttal of the criticisms that criminal procedure puts a premium upon wealth and is "unscientific."
But the respect in which the American Law Institute
Code points the way to the greatest improvement in Colorado criminal procedure is one not so often mentioned in
popular criticism.
The Colorado provisions regarding
criminal procedure are thoroughly haphazard. They show
the work of many skillful but uncoordinated hands. Here
their work is detailed, concrete; there, vague and general.
Often it contradicts itself and even more often it leaves one
wondering whether it does or not.
It is idle to debate the advantages and disadvantages of
codification versus the growth and development of the common law by the judicial process, for Colorado statutes of
criminal procedure have achieved a compromise embodying
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the disadvantages of both and the advantages of neither.
They are an incomplete code that is neither flesh, fowl, nor
good red herring. They form a crooked splint that emasculates the flexibility of the law without even the compensating
advantage of holding it straight and secure.
No glib and easy way to Utopia, the adoption of the
American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure in
place of the existing statutes would not fully meet popular
criticism of criminal justice. It would, however, work a
great substantive improvement in bringing the law up to the
date of the society in which it exists, and achieve a desperately
needed transition in mechanics from confusion to clarity,
STANLEY L. DREXLER,
order, and practicability.
Class of 1936.

THE SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS IN COLORADO
HE common law on the survival of actions was best
expressed by the maxim "Actio personalis moritur cum
persona." By enactment of the territorial legislature,
January 10, 1868, that maxim, with the rest of the general
common law as of the fourth year of the reign of James I
(1607) became a part of the law of the territory which was
to be the State of Colorado. Another act of the same legislature, in the same year, set out the rule of survival of actions
which, with a slight modification, stands as law in Colorado
today. Under the schedule to the Constitution, both acts
became a part of the law of the State of Colorado. The statute declaring survival appears, as reenacted by Section 167
of the Session Laws of 1903, as Section 5383 of the Compiled Laws of 1921, reading: "All actions at law whatsoever, save and except actions on the case for slander or libel,
or trespass for injuries done to the person, and actions for the
recovery of real property, shall survive to and against executors, administrators, and conservators."
By the terms of this statute, the rule of the common law
is reversed. Instead of "Actio personalis moritur," we find
the law to be "All actions . . . shall survive," and only the
exceptions to the general statement of the Colorado statute
are in accord with the common law. Let us then proceed to
the interpretation of that statute.

